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DOMESTIC AIRLINE PASSENGER REMEDIES
WALLACE C. MAGATHAN, III*
VICTORIA A. FRANKS**
T he infrequent airliner crash in the United States is a ma-
jor disaster that receives worldwide attention and always
produces personal injury and wrongful death claims involving
large sums of money. Legal analysis of passenger claims natu-
rally tends to focus on such disasters, with the result that the
more common events that cause problems for passengers re-
ceive much less attention. The purpose of this article is to
provide an overview of the typical problems that confront
United States' domestic passengers, including a brief discus-
sion of punitive damages as applied in domestic passenger
cases.2
The most common domestic passenger claims, other than
those arising out of air crashes, can be grouped into four gen-
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1 See infra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
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eral areas: (1) baggage claims; (2) claims arising from unan-
nouced schedule changes; (3) claims arising from instances of
denied boarding; and (4) personal injury claims arising from
accidents occurring in or around the airplane or terminal area.
Federal and state law, Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) Reg-
ulations, and Passenger Rules Tariffs all play a role in fash-
ioning the passenger's rights and remedies in the first three
areas. The fourth area, personal injury claims, normally do
not involve the application of any aviation-related federal
statutes and routinely are treated as ordinary torts under ap-
plicable state laws. The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,-
which provides for the elimination of all tariffs as of January
1, 1983" and for the dissolution of the CAB on January 1,
1985,5 will have a substantial impact on the resolution of these
domestic claims.
I. BAGGAGE CLAIMS
Claims for lost, damaged, or pilfered luggage occur more
frequently than any other type of claim and are the most
thoroughly regulated. At the time of this writing, each carrier
is required to file tariffs that specify, among other things, "all
classifications, rules, regulations, practices and services" fol-
lowed by the carrier.' These federal tariffs constitute the con-
tract of carriage between the airlines and their passengers and
govern the rights and liabilities of each.7 The CAB is empow-
ered to reject any tariff filed by a carrier, and any such re-
jected tariff is void.' The CAB permits tariffs that limit a car-
rier's liability for baggage claims, requiring only that the limit
be no lower than $750.' The CAB regulations require that no-
a Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
18, 26, 49 U.S.C.).
49 U.S.C. § 1551(a)(2)(A) (Supp. III 1979).
a Id. § 1551(a)(4).
e 49 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (1976); 14 C.F.R. § 221.3(a) (1982).
See Tishman & Lipp, Inc. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 413 F.2d 1401 (2d Cir. 1969)
(holding that tariffs filed with the CAB if valid are conclusive and exclusive; rights
and liabilities between the parties are governed thereby); Mao v. Eastern Airlines,
310 F. Supp. 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (holding that tariffs filed with the CAB constitute
the exclusive contract of carriage between 'airlines and their passengers).
8 49 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (1976); 14 C.F.R. § 221.180 (1982).
' C.A.B. ORDER No. 77-2-9, reprinted in 72 C.A.B. 822 (1977).
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tice of the liability limitations be placed on each ticket and
posted at the ticket counter.'0 On January 1, 1983, however,
all tariffs governing domestic air transportation will no longer
be effective under the terms of the Airline Deregulation Act."
Recognizing the void that would occur in its consumer protec-
tion measures by the expiration of the tariffs, the CAB has
been -moving forward in several areas to promulgate federal
regulations that are intended to provide continuing protection
to consumers in those areas. One of these areas concerns bag-
gage claims. New CAB Regulation Part 254, which took effect
on January 23, 1983, shortly after the tariffs expired, provides
for a minimum liability limit of $1,000 and requires that no-
tice of any such limit be placed on the passengers' ticket. 2
Significantly, the claim-filing deadlines and the statutes of
limitations, now found in the tariffs, are not codified in the
new CAB Regulation Part 254.
An issue that has been litigated frequently and will con-
tinue to be litigated in the future is the adequacy of the notice
provided to the passenger concerning the limitation of the
carrier's liability. Even before 1971, when the CAB required
that the carriers provide notice of limitations of liability, the
courts ruled in favor of the carriers. Following a line of old
railroad cases, courts held that the tariff limitations applied
without regard to whether notice of the limitations was em-
bodied in the transportation documents.'"
Notwithstanding that line of cases, the CAB later promul-
gated a regulation requiring that the tariffs provide for notice
on the passengers' tickets, 4 which has naturally strengthened
the carriers' position on this issue. The majority of court deci-
sions continue to reject claims of lack of notice or the inade-
10 14 C.F.R. § 221.176(a), (b) (1982).
:1 49 U.S.C. § 1551(a)(2)(A) (Supp. III 1979).
$ Domestic Baggage Liability, 47 Fed. Reg. 52990 (1982) (to be codified at 14
C.F.R. § 254).
,3 See, e.g., VogelSang v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 302 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1962). See also
Tishman & Lipp, Inc. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 413 F.2d 1401 (2d Cir. 1969); Mao v.
Eastern Airlines, 310 F. Supp. 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
14 14 C.F.R. § 221.176 (1982).
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quacy of notice.1" At least one case has held, however, that the
notice was inadequate" because it was insufficiently conspicu-
ous. The new regulation,17 replacing the tariff provisions re-
garding notice, does not set forth the language and type-size
of the notice specified for tariffs in the later CAB regulation. 8
While the cases to date would provide some support for the
carriers' continuing their present notice practices, the fact
that the new regulations will not constitute part of the "con-
tract of carriage" suggests that a wiser course for the carriers
may be to display the notice of liability limits more promi-
nently than is done at this time.
Until now, plaintiffs have litigated without much success
the issue of whether the claim filing deadlines and statutes of
limitations set forth in the tariff are superseded by state stat-
utes of limitations for contract actions in those cases in which
plaintiffs have missed the tariff deadline but are within the
state law deadlines. Citing the "principle of uniformity" of
treatment that acts to avoid preferential treatment by estab-
lishing a national equality of rates and services, the courts
have held that the tariff provisions are the "sole and exclu-
sive" remedy available,1' and that the tariffs, therefore, "oc-
cup[y] the field to the exclusion of state law.""0 Any claim
brought after the tariff's limitation period must, therefore, be
dismissed.2" The new provisions of Part 254 have no time lim-
itation provisions, however, so state law will control in each
case. This change promises to cause problems for the airlines,
who may be faced in the future with baggage claims, large and
small, brought years after the fact.
15 See United States v. Edwards, 602 F.2d 458 (lst Cir. 1979); N. Am. Phillips v.
Emery Air Freight Corp., 579 F.2d 229 (2d Cir. 1978).; Shea v. National Airlines, Inc.,
16 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,822 (Mass. Sup. Ct. 1981).
" Greenberg v. United Airlines, Inc., 98 Misc. 2d 544, 414 N.Y.S. 2d 240 (Kings
County Ct., N.Y. 1979).
14 C.F.R. § 254.4 (1982).
14 C.F.R. § 221.176(b) (1982).
See Tishman & Lipp, Inc. v. Delta AirLines, Inc., 413 F.2d 1401 (2d. Cir. 1969);
Mao v. Eastern Airlines, 310 F. Supp. 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
20 North Am. Phillips Corp. v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 579 F.2d 229, 234 (2d Cir.
1978).
21 Shea v. National Airlines, Inc., 16 Av. CAs. (CCH) 17,822 (Mass. 1981).
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II. CLAIMS ARISING FROM UNANNOUNCED SCHEDULE CHANGES
When a scheduled flight is delayed, diverted, or cancelled
for whatever reason, ticketed passengers are obviously incon-
venienced, and some passengers bring suit against the airline
at fault. Damages recoverable in these situations are often
limited by several factors. Such limiting factors include the
carriers' federal tariffs, applicable state and federal statutes,
CAB regulations, exculpatory provisions printed on tickets,
and normal problems of proof.
Currently, in the event of a flight cancellation, applicable
tariffs require the airline to make alternative arrangements on
its next available flight. If arrangements acceptable to the
passenger cannot be made, the airline is obligated to try to
make alternate arrangements with another airline. The final
alternative is to make an involuntary refund to the passenger.
Many airlines' tariffs also provide that the carrier will be re-
sponsible for providing the passenger with certain amenities
including meals, lodging, phone calls and ground trans-
portation.22
Until 1979, a passenger whose flight was cancelled, was lim-
ited solely to those remedies set forth in the tariffs. Rule 380
(predecessor to current Rule 240), paragraph H, provided that
"[elxcept to the extent provided for in this rule, no carrier
shall be liable for failing to operate any flight according to
schedule or for changing the schedule of any flight, with or
without notice to passengers."' 3 On September 20, 1979, the
CAB issued an order cancelling Rule 380(H), finding it to be
unlawful.' The cancellation of Rule 380(H) gave passengers
the right to pursue common law remedies for flight cancella-
tions in addition to those set forth in Rule 380 (now Rule
240). The cancellation of Rule 380(H), however, does not ap-
pear to have precipitated a flood of litigation by passengers
seeking common law remedies against airlines for the inconve-
nience and disruption of their travel plans. In the actions that
" CAB No. 352, Passenger Rule Tariff No. PR-7, Rule 240.
13 See CAB ORDER No. 79-9-129, reprinted in 83 C.A.B. 927 (1979).
" CAB ORDER No. 79-9-129, reprinted in 83 C.A.B. 927 (1979).
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are initiated, passengers stumble into several roadblocks that
continue to limit the carriers' liability.
Since most airlines' tariffs obligate the airlines to at least
refund a passenger's ticket in the event of a flight cancellation
and often to pay the passenger a minimal amount to defray
expenses if he is stranded, most passengers bringing legal ac-
tions seek, in addition to their out-of-pocket expenses, dam-
ages for mental distress and punitive damages. The bases for
the recovery alleged vary but have included breach of con-
tract, breach of the common carrier's common law duty of car-
riage, and misrepresentation. Depending on the applicable
state law, the passenger often has problems not only with
proving the amount of damages, but also with proving the ele-
ments of the underlying cause of action.
Some of the more recent cases in which passengers have
sought damages for cancelled flights reflect several of these
problems. In Kutner v. Eastern Airlines," passengers sued for
damages for "great mental anguish and severe shock" suffered
when their flight was diverted from its destination because of
weather. They allegedly received no assistance from the car-
rier and decided to rent a car and drive in icy conditions and
fog to their original destination.' Plaintiffs sued under Penn-
sylvania law, which allows for recovery in tort for negligent
infliction of emotional distress and for recovery for emotional
harm by breach of contract.' 7 The court in Pennsylvania de-
nied recovery under the tort theory because plaintiffs were
within no "zone of danger" of harm from physical impact, de-
nied recovery for emotional harm on the contract theory be-
cause there was no physical impact, and entered summary
judgment for the airline."
The laws of the various states differ as to what kind of dam-
ages may be sought under various theories of recovery. In
some states, as seen in Amon v. Eastern Airlines,9 mental
514 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
" Id. at 554.
27 Id. at 557-58.
Id. at 559.
" 16 Av. CAS. (CCH) 17,919 (D.C. Ore. 1981).
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suffering and punitive damages are not recoverable in actions
sounding in contract. That court noted, however, that Oregon
observes the common law duty of a carrier to properly serve
passengers and a plaintiff could, therefore, bring an action in
tort to recover those damages.30
Even if the applicable state law allows recovery for the type
of damages sought by the passenger, he may yet be denied
recovery by reason of tariffs and ticket provisions. In Johnson
v. Northwest Orient Airlines,"' an air carrier was found not
liable for lost wages allegedly resulting from the passenger's
late arrival at his destination after the flight was cancelled be-
cause of poor weather. The Montana Supreme Court cited
Rule 240(H) of the Passenger Rules Tariff, which provides for
cancellations when "necessary" and found the carrier to be
acting within its legal authority in cancelling the flight.2
Although Rule 240(H) was not cited, the question concern-
ing whether a carrier's decision to skip a scheduled stop was
based on "necessity" is seen in Amon v. Eastern Airlines." In
Amon the following language was written on the ticket issued
to the passenger, "Carrier. . .may. . . omit stopping places
shown on the ticket in case of necessity. 3 4 The court in Ore-
gon denied Eastern's motion for summary judgment, as it con-
cluded there was a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether Eastern's decision to skip a stop was based on neces-
sity. Implied in the ruling was that "necessity" is a defense
upon which carriers may rely.
In Vick v. National Airlines,5 the airline diverted a non-
stop New Orleans to Miami flight into Pensacola, Florida to
discharge and pick up passengers, a point that the flight had
overflown for weather reasons while enroute to New Orleans.
The court found the airline's diversion was for business rea-
sons, a breach of contract not justified by operational neces-
80 Id. at 17,920.
31 642 P.2d 1067 (Mont. 1980).
a' 642 P.2d at 1068.
16 Av. CAs. (CCH) 17,919 (D.C. Ore. 1981).
u Id. at 17,920.
Id. at 17,921.
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sity 6 Plaintiffs, as a result, missed their connecting interna-
tional flight and, consequently, their planned vacation, for
which the court awarded $2,500 each for their "pain and suf-
fering, mental anguish, [and] inconvenience ....
It appears that if an airline has a valid safety or operational
reason for delaying or diverting a flight, the passenger will
have difficulty recovering for his inconvenience. The defense
is likely to remain a good one after expiration of other tariffs,
provided the carriers provide adequate notice on their tickets,
as in Amon. After the tariffs expire, however, the carriers will
no longer be required by the CAB to provide compensation
and amenities to stranded passengers. At the time of this
writing, the CAB has made no plans to regulate this area, as it
has done in the area of oversales and baggage claims. After
January 1, 1983, the passengers' remedies for delayed flights
may depend greatly on the choice of carrier.
III. CLAIMS ARISING FROM INSTANCES OF DENIED BOARDING
Most instances of denied boarding occur when an airline
has "oversold" or "overbooked" a flight and there is an insuf-
ficient number of seats on the aircraft to accommodate all
passengers who hold tickets for the flight. Less frequently, lit-
igation will arise when a handicapped or disabled person who
is holding a ticket is not allowed to board the aircraft at the
gate for some reason. Since 1967, the CAB has regulated the
area of overbooking, but the CAB has promulgated no regula-
tions to alleviate potential boarding problems involving handi-
capped or disabled persons."
Part 250 is an unusual federal regulation, in that it has been
generally well received by the affected public. The regulations
set the amount of denied boarding compensation the carriers
must pay passengers, as well as the exceptions to eligibility for
denied boarding compensation. 9 Part 250 also requires that
the carriers give notice of their policy of overbooking flights at
" 16 Av. CAs. (CCH) 18,404 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
'7 Id. at 18,405.
- 14 C.F.R. § 250 (1982).
- Id. §§ 250.5, 250.6 (1982).
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their ticket desks and on each ticket,40 and that they establish
their own boarding priority rules.4' Another provision requires
that the carriers make these priority rules known to passen-
gers in an overbooking situation. 3 In overbooking situations,
carriers are required to make known to the affected passen-
gers the denied boarding compensation that the carriers are
required to offer and to first ask for "volunteers" before deny-
ing boarding to any person against his will. 43
The regulations require that carriers offer a passenger who
is denied boarding involuntarily an amount equal to twice the
value of the ticket he holds to his destination, up to a maxi-
mum of $400.00, but in no case less than $75.00.44 Thus, a
carrier who overbooks a flight from Richmond to Washington,
D.C. may prefer to deny boarding to persons whose final des-
tination is Washington, D.C., as opposed to those persons who
may be flying on to Los Angeles. It is that sort of discrimina-
tion that the boarding priority rules required by title 14, sec-
tion 250.3 of the Code of Federal Regulations are designed to
prevent, which, if violated, may give rise to a cause of action
under the anti-discrimination provisions of the Federal Avia-
tion Act.45 A carrier may reduce its offer by one-half if it is
able to arrange for "comparable air transportation" that gets
the passenger to. his destination within two hours of
schedule.4
After giving some thought to revoking Part 250 altogether
as part of its "pre-sunset" examination of consumer protec-
tion rules, the CAB elected to continue it with minor changes.
One of the changes, that took effect January 23, 1983, is that
carriers are no longer required to offer compensation to pas-
sengers for whom the carrier can arrange comparable air
transportation that gets the passenger to his destination
40 Id. § 250.11 (1982).
41 Id. § 250.3 (1982).
42 Id. § 250.9 (1982).
4I Id.
4 Id. § 250.5 (1982).
45 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1976). See, e.g., Miuccio v. Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane, 16
Av. CAs. (CCH) 17,898 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
46 14 C.F.R. § 250.5 (1982).
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within one hour."'
Interestingly, Part 250 only requires the carriers to offer
passengers compensation for denied boarding. Passengers may
reject the offer and pursue their common law remedies. Pas-
sengers who accept the offer are entitled to receive payment
on the same day,48 and that payment constitutes liquidated
damages for all damages incurred by the passenger as a result
of the denied boarding.4 9
There are several exceptions to the compensation provisions
of Part 250. The passenger is not entitled to compensation un-
less he presents himself at the "appropriate time and place
having complied fully with the carrier's requirements as to
ticketing, check-in and reconfirmation procedures ....",0
Another exception is if the passenger is accommodated in a
section of the aircraft other than is specified on his ticket. In
the latter case, a passenger with a first class ticket accommo-
dated in the tourist section would be entitled to a refund of
the difference in ticket price. 1 A third exception, pertaining
to government requisitioned space, will no longer be applica-
ble after January 23, 1983.
Passengers seeking compensation in court have proceeded
under a variety of theories, but most often upon the anti-dis-
crimination provision of the Federal Aviation Act." That sec-
tion, 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b), which provides that no air carrier
shall give unreasonable preference or advantage to any person
or subject any particular person to any unjust discrimination,
was designed to protect consumers of interstate air transpor-
tation from discriminatory practices."
Depending upon the state, passengers suing under the anti-
"" 47 Fed. Reg. 52,980 (1982).
4 14 C.F.R. § 250.8 (1982).
" Id. § 250.4(b) (1982); See Wasserman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 632 F.2d 69
(8th Cir. 1980).
10 14 C.F.R. § 250.6(a) (1982).
11 Id. § 250.6(c)(1982).
52 47 Fed. Reg. 52,980 (1982).
63 49 U.S.C. §1374(b) (1976).
See Kodish v. United Airlines, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 1245, (1979) afi'd, 628 F.2d
1301 (10th Cir. 1980); Kalison v. Trans World Airlines, 50 Ohio St. 2d 273, 362
N.E.2d 994 (1977).
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discrimination section for "bumping" in a discriminatory
fashion can recover "purely nominal compensatory damages
... including an award for humiliation and hurt feelings
when the facts warrant."55 Punitive damages may also be re-
covered under the Act."
While overbooking by itself does not violate the section,
several courts have found a carrier's failure to follow its own
boarding priority rules in an overbooking situation to be in
violation of § 1374(b). 57 In Miuccio v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree
Italiane,s the passenger brought an action alleging violation
of 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b) when she was bumped from a flight
from New York to Rome. The plaintiff-passenger asserted
that other passengers had been permitted to board in order of
their check-in at the ticket counter even though the carrier's
priority rules gave her priority over those who made reserva-
tions and purchased tickets after she did. The District Court
for the Southern District of New York held that she had
stated a cause of action under 49 U.S.C.§ 1374(b) and that it
was the carrier's burden to explain why each passenger was
boarded before her."
Basing one's cause of action upon violation of § 1374(b) is
not necessarily a guaranteed route to recovery. The primary
problem plaintiffs have had in relying upon the statute is that
§ 1374(b) does not expressly authorize a private right of ac-
tion to enforce its provisions. In determining whether a pri-
vate remedy exists, courts consider the following facts:
1. Whether plaintiff is one of the class for whose special benefit
the statute was enacted;
2. Any indication of the intent by the legislature, explicit or
implicit, to create such a remedy or to deny one;
3. Whether it is consistent with the underlying purposes of the
Mahaney v. Air France, 474 F. Supp. 532, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (quoting Archi-
bald v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 460 F.2d 14, 16 (9th Cir. 1972).
w Sherrod v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 46 (E.D. Tenn. 1978).
57Miuccio v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, 16 Av. CAs. (CCH) 17,989 (S.D.N.Y.
1981).
" Id.
59 See Archibald v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 460 F.2d 14, 17 (9th Cir.
1972).
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legislature to imply a remedy; and
4. Whether the cause of action is traditionally relegated to
state law, in an area basically the concern of the states, so that
it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely
on federal law.60
Plaintiffs have been denied a private right of action most fre-
quently for failure to satisfy points one and four of the four-
point test presented above. Courts have usually required that
the plaintiff must have been the actual passenger who sus-
tained the injury in order to be considered a member of the
class for which the statute was intended. In Roman v. Delta
Air Lines, Inc.,61 a district Court in Illinois held that parents
of a passenger who was unable to attend a family reunion be-
cause he had been bumped from an overbooked flight were in
a position too remote to recover under § 1374(b). Similarly, in
Mason v. Belieu,e2 the Circuit Court for the District of Co-
lumbia dismissed a wife's suit for emotional distress, allegedly
caused by the airline's unjustified denial of transportation to
her husband, because she was not within the protected class
of the anti-discrimination provisions of the statute. If there
are adequate state remedies, some federal courts have been
reluctant to grant a federal private remedy under § 1374(b).
Where the conduct allegedly committed by the airlines may
constitute one or more violations of state law, "only where
there is some countervailing national interest should the fed-
eral courts imply a federal private remedy when an adequate
state remedy exists." 63
An additional theory of recovery, based on common law
misrepresentation, is illustrated by the well-known case of de-
nied boarding involving consumer-activist Ralph Nader. In
Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc.," the Supreme Court held
0 See, Wolf v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 544 F.2d 124 (3d Cir. 1976); Kutner v.
Eastern Airlines, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 553, 555 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
' 441 F. Supp. 1160 (E.D. Il. 1977).
*' 543 F.2d 215 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
0 Kutner v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 553, 557 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Wolf v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 544 F.2d 134, 138 (3d Cir. 1976) (quoting Polansky v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 523 F.2d 332, 337 (3d Cir. 1975)).
64 426 U.S. 290 (1976).
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that Mr. Nader, who was denied boarding despite having a
confirmed seat, could litigate a claim for common law misrep-
resentation. Mr. Nader's claim was based on a total absence of
disclosure concerning the likelihood that his confirmed ticket
might not be honored. At trial he received a small compensa-
tory award and a $25,000 award for punitive damages." The
award for punitive damages was reversed on appeal, however,
because the appellate court found that Allegheny's policy of
non-disclosure of its booking practices was not "willful and
wanton". 66
Another case involving misrepresentation was Angel v. Pan
American World Airways. 7 In that case the passenger alleged
that Pan Am unlawfully refused to board him, a handicapped
individual, because he was traveling without an attendant. 8
Plaintiff alleged that the agent who sold him the ticket as-
sured him that he would be permitted to fly alone without an
attendant.69 When the plaintiff arrived at the airport, how-
ever, he was denied boarding pursuant to Pan American's tar-
iffs which prohibited transportation of such a passenger with-
out an attendant.70 The District Court for the District of
Columbia held that the plaintiff could not proceed on a mis-
representation theory because there could be no misrepresen-
tation regarding a provision of a filed tariff since the passen-
ger and the airline are both bound by the terms of the tariff
and have constructive notice of it.7 ' The court distinguished
the Angel case from Nader on the grounds that Nader did not
involve a tariff provision.
After Mr. Nader's incident, the CAB in 1978 promulgated a
regulation 78 requiring that the airlines bring to the attention
of their passengers the practice of overbooking.74 This re-
eId. at 295.
Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 626 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
:7 519 F. Supp. 1173 (D.D.C. 1981).
68 Id. at 1175.
:9 Id. at 1176.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 1182.
72 Id.
73 14 C.F.R. § 250.11 (1982).
74 Id.
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quired notice makes it difficult for today's passenger to pre-
vail on a misrepresentation theory against a carrier. Moreover,
as the circuit court noted in the Nader decision, 75 the practice
of overbooking in the air transportation industry has become
public information, openly discussed by the carriers, the
Board, and publications of national circulation.76 In light of
these developments, the Nader theory of misrepresentation
for recovery in overbooking cases is probably stillborn.
While the 1978 CAB regulation requiring notice of
overbooking may have extinguished the misrepresentation
theory for some passengers, the expiration of the CAB tariffs
on January 1, 1983, may have cleared the way for handi-
capped persons, such as the plaintiff in the Angel case, to
..bring suit on a misrepresentation theory when denied
boarding.
In another case involving a handicapped plaintiff," a deaf
woman won a $25,000 jury verdict from Texas International
Airlines for breach of contract when she was not allowed to
board her flight with her hearing guide dog.78 The carrier's
tariffs provided for transportation of hearing guide dogs in the
passenger cabin, but the ticket agent in Baltimore was unfa-
miliar with the provision and as a result the plaintiff missed
her flight.7 9 Although the jury. awarded her compensatory
damages, it denied her claim for punitive damages. At this
writing, the trial judge has not yet decided any of the post-
trial motions. After expiration of the tariffs, handicapped per-
sons in this type of case may be forced to rely on a § 1374(b)
action, with less chance of success.
IV. PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS
From a review of the recent case law regarding passenger
suits against airlines for personal injuries, not including
76 512 F.2d 527 (D.C.Cir. 1975), rev'd, 426 U.S. 290 (1976).
"e Id. at 533-35.





wrongful death or other injuries sustained in a crash, it ap-
pears that the bulk of the suits in which liability is disputed
involve incidents occuring during the period immediately
before and after the flight. The absence of reported cases in-
volving inflight incidents suggests that the carriers rarely dis-
pute liability in such cases. CAB regulation 14 C.F.R. §
221.38(h) makes explicit that carriers may not rely upon any
CAB regulation as a basis for the filing of a tariff limiting re-
covery for personal injury or death.80 Similarly, the CAB has
never accepted a tariff setting a limit on recovery for personal
injury or death.
The extent to which the airline was exercising control over
the area where the injury occurred and the nature of the pas-
senger's activity when injured are the relevant considerations
in determining airline liability for personal injury to the pas-
senger.8' The issue of control arises frequently where a pas-
senger is injured before or after his flight, away from the ac-
tual physical presence of the aircraft, such as on an escalator
in the airport, in the baggage area, or in the parking lot at the
airport. In these cases, unless the passenger brings forth evi-
dence that the airline exercised control over the area in which
the accident occurred, the airline will not be held liable for
the passenger's injuries." The absence of applicable federal
law and the CAB's express withdrawal from regulatory effort
in this area leave such cases to be brought under the provi-
sions of the applicable state's tort law as a typical personal
injury case.
V. PUNITIvE DAMAGES
Frequently, passengers filing suit for the reasons discussed
above will claim punitive as well as compensatory damages.
Indeed, it may be necessary to prevail on the punitive claim in
order to recover the cost of bringing these types of suits. In
most cases in which punitive damages are sought, the plaintiff
80 14 C.F.R. § 221.38(h) (1982).
81 Hernandez v. Air France, 545 F.2d 279, 282 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied , 430
U.S. 950 (1977).
8' Powell v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 16 Av. CAs. (CCH) 17,741 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1981).
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must prove willful, wanton and deliberate conduct on the part
of the defendant. In cases involving an alleged violation of the
anti-discrimination provision of the Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b),
meeting this proof requirement has proved difficult even in
cases where the court allows the plaintiff to proceed under the
statute and to recover compensatory damages.8
The first bumping case in which a plaintiff received puni-
tive damages was Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. 4 The
plaintiff was awarded $5,000 in exemplary damages when he
was bumped from a flight by the carrier who gave his tourist
seat to a first class passenger contrary to the airline's priority
seating procedures. 5 The punitive damage award was based
on the court's finding that the airline deliberately practiced
overbooking," a fact that is now much more widely known
and for reasons stated above"" would probably not be the ba-
sis for recovery today. In a more recent denied-boarding case,
Kluczynski v. Delta Airlines", the Cook County, Illinois Cir-
cuit Court reduced a combined $200,000 punitive damage
awared to $5,000 for the two plaintiffs. The court ruled that
the jury had correctly found that Delta had been willful and
wanton for its failure to follow its priority boarding rules in
allowing airline employees to remain on the aircraft while the
plaintiffs were bumped. 9 The court, however, reduced the
$8,000 compensatory damage award to $2,000, finding the
jury's award excessive.9ePlaintiffs will also have problems in recovering punitive
damages in cases in which they are seeking such damages
from the airline for the specific acts of its employees. Because
the punitive and admonitory justifications for the imposition
9 See, e.g., Cordero v. CIA Mexicana De Aviaciod, 512 F. Supp. 205 (C.D. Cal.
1981), modified, 681 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1982) (court of appeals reversed the district
court's dismissal of $1,000 damages but upheld dismissal of $35,000 punitive
damages).
" 200 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
Id. at 362, 368.
" Id. at 367.
, See supra text accompanying note 83.
88 Civil No. 76 L 11915 (Cook County Civ. Ct. Feb. 12, 1982).
88 Id. at 21.
Id. at 26.
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of punitive damages are sharply diminished in those cases in
which liability is imposed vicariously, many courts have re-
quired that in order to obtain such recovery certain require-
ments must be met:
a) the principal or managerial agent authorized the doing and
the manner of the act; or
b) the agent was unfit and the principal or managerial unit was
reckless in employing or retaining him; or
c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was
acting in the scope of his employment; or
d) the principal or managerial agent of the principal ratified or
approved the act."
Courts have differed in their application of the general princi-
ples cited. For example, in Shackelford v. Puerto Rico Inter-
national Airlines,92 punitive damages were found not to be
proper in a case involving an airline passenger who allegedly
sustained personal injuries during a rough landing." The pas-
senger claimed negligence on the part of the pilot." It was
determined that punitive damages could not be sought from
the air carrier because the airline did not authorize or approve
the manner in which the plane landed, was not reckless in em-
ploying or retaining the pilot, and did not employ the pilot in
a managerial capacity.' 5 Although the pilot exercised total
control over the aircraft under his command, he had no deci-
sion-making authority within the corporate structure of the
airline; he was like any other employee performing routine
tasks." His actions could not be said to express corporate pol-
icy; therefore, his wrongful acts would not amount to deliber-
ate corporate participation therein. 7
On the other hand, a Tennessee district court awarded pu-
nitive damages in a case in which the conduct of an airline's
91 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 909 (1977); See also Shackelford v. Puerto
Rico Int'l Airlines, 16 Av. CAS. (CCH) 17,259 (D.C.V.I. 1979).
92 16 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,259 (D.C.V.I. 1979).
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flight attendant and captain in having a passenger removed
from the aircraft was at issue.' 8 The aircraft was delayed one
hour until the police obtained and served an arrest warrant
upon the plaintiff for disorderly conduct. 9 The court held
that there appeared to be evidence from which the jury might
have found that in the instant situation the defendant's
agents were acting in managerial capacities. 100 The court did
not expound on which evidence led to this assumption.
VI. CONCLUSION
With the exception of bodily injury claims, CAB regulations
have played a significant role in shaping the remedies availa-
ble to the airline passenger. The expiration of the tariffs on
January 1, 1983, as mandated by the Airline Deregulation Act,
promises to change the law in ways often not favorable to the
passenger. The power of the CAB to revoke an objectionable
tariff will no longer be an effective way to preclude airlines
from initiating practices unfavorable to passengers. It will be
interesting to see what the airlines do to change their compen-
sation policies covering flights that are delayed or diverted for
unavoidable reasons. Although the Airline Deregulation Act
provides for the dissolution of the CAB on January 1, 1985,
the fate of the CAB regulations, including the "consumer pro-
tection" provisions, is not addressed. Congress will presuma-
bly act sometime before then to specify which agencies, if any,
will become responsible for the CAB regulations. The fre-
quent traveler may hope that the members of Congress, as
frequent travelers themselves, will not permit those regula-
tions beneficial to passengers to expire.
" Sherrod v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 46 (E.D. Tenn. 1978).
Id. at 55.
I" Id. at 53.
